Monday 31 October 2011

A few people have asked the wisdom of my advice to gradually sell off their equities as the stock market rebounds. I've mentioned that I expect indices to rebound in the 4th quarter of 2011. We may face a correction in Nov but a strong rebound in Dec 2011. Indeed I expect a correction of the STI to as low as 2750, giving up 50% of the gains made in the Oct rebound. But by the end of 2011, we may reach 3050. It will attract a lot retail investors who think that the bull is back.

If you look at the anatomy of a bear, there are plenty of rebounds, so much so that the rebounds almost touch the highest point. The subsequent sell down is usually swift.

Nothing is 100% ever. I will continue to reduce European Bank perps and stocks by end of 2011. It's up to you.

Saturday 22 October 2011

Being Wronged and Being Accused of Wronging the "Wronger"

Life is short. In a short space of 3 months, I've had two deaths in my extended family. My youngest uncle from my father's side passed away suddenly of liver cancer. In my mother's side, my 4th aunty died of stage 4 breast cancer. I have a former class mate where we were formerly quite close struggling with colon cancer. I also have a co-worker who's father may be diagnosed with colon cancer.

Death surrounds me constantly. Or maybe I'm now more aware of it now that I'm older. Often I wonder when my turn will come. Will I die suddenly while exercising, or will I die an agonising death after a long illness. Will I live to see my future children grow up and have children of their own. How does it feel like to be the person who's struggling.

Death puts things into perspective. It tells me that at the end of it all, we die and leave behind memories with all that bumped into us in this short journey. All our grudges, our money, our earthly possessions, are left behind. We can't take a single cent with us to the grave. How we respond to this is important. We can choose to politick in the office and stab one another in life. We can choose to make lots of friends for political reasons and then form cronies. We can choose to achieve something in life, to right the wrongs, to install justice and to make an organisation better. We choose the legacy that we leave behind.

I choose to leave behind a legacy. I am not the most patient of persons. I may not be the joker that will lift everybody's moods (although I try). But I aim to do what's right and persuade others to do the same. A lot of things don't matter in life; our anger, our jealousy, our hurts, just comes back to hurt us more. The solution is to forgive others as much as we can, and to be patient and love others more. It is not easy, because emotions often gets in the way. But I will try to be.

There are times when I try to communicate with people whom I need to work with constantly. But whether by deliberation or by sheer nonchalance, I am ignored. I will then escalate this to people who are involved in order to illicit a response. I act with urgency in most things I do, especially when I think they are important.

The most difficult people to deal with are those that don't wish to communicate with you honestly. They just say "ok" and then go do another thing. Or they just ignore you. Although in front of you, they say that they are still "one family", they will not respond to any email or sms. It is difficult to deal with such people because they are not frank... they will not come clean...

In any case, life is too short to be bothered by people and work. My cute little niece is here for 10 days and it's an important event in my life; to see her grow up. Having a kid in the house puts things into perspective...

Have a great weekend everyone... reflect about what we do everyday... it may make us become better persons...

Thursday 20 October 2011

European TARP



What Winston Churchill said about America, that it can be counted on to do the right thing after it exhausts the other alternatives, seems equally applicable to Europe. It is slowly but inexorably moving toward its own version of TARP—the U.S. “toxic asset relief program”. Rather than sub-prime mortgages and related derivatives, the toxic assets in Europe are sovereign credits, which in some cases is a function of the nationalization of private sector debt.
Although Slovakia provided some last minute drama, policy makers and investors were already anticipating the approval of the reforms of the European Financial Stabilization Fund (EFSF) and looking beyond, toward implementation. The shift in the focus has helped spur a bout of position-adjusting.
Euro

As illustrated by the net non-commercial positions at the IMM, the short-term momentum and trend-following market had amassed a large short euro position from late August through early October (the largest in a little more than a year). For the better part of two weeks, the euro has been trending higher as these shorts have been covered.
As noted in an earlier post, the euro-dollar exchange rate is the most correlated (rolling 60-day, percent change) with the S&P 500 as it (or its synthetic) has been since at least the early 1990s. The euro-dollar exchange rate is also near its highest correlation, with 2-year U.S.-German interest rate differentials as well. The Fed’s promise to keep rates low until at least mid-2013 takes some volatility out of the U.S. 2-year yield, so the spread has tended to be more a function of the German side of the equation.
There are two main drivers of short-term German interest rates. The first is economic data. The eurozone economy has slowed down markedly from Q1, including the German economy. The unwinding of at least one of this year’s two rate hikes is likely by the end of the year (we suspect December when the new ECB President will have revised staff GDP and inflation forecasts to guide the decision). This has arguably helped lower 2-year German rates.
The second force, investors’ embrace of Germany as a safe haven, seems the stronger of the drivers. As the debt crisis increased in intensity in September and early October, the demand for German paper grew. The German 2-year fell to record lows in late September near 32 bp. During the bout of position adjusting, the German yield has more than doubled and the premium it offers over the U.S. has doubled from 20 bp to 40 bp.
There is scope for additional positioning in the coming days, ahead of the October 23 EU summit. The next technical objectives are found around the $1.4000-50 area. Given the extreme market positioning and the right noises coming from European officials, the data stream suggests that the world’s largest economy has accelerated since mid-year rather than slowed further. This could propel the euro and overshoot these technical targets.
Europe’s Tarp

Germany and France appeared to have a “eureka moment”. International pressure/criticism is mounting, investors and businesses fear a financial apocalypse, a political backlash is evident in Germany throughout the year in state elections, and the Socialists winning control of the French Senate for the first time in the Fifth Republic. Merkel and Sarkozy have promised a “durable” fix. Market participants are in effect buying the rumor of new measures and could very well sell when it becomes news.
The incrementalism of European officials through the crisis is partly institutional in nature. It is a congenital defect, but one that made the birth possible in the first place. Eurozone members surrender/abdicate monetary policy but have thought they maintained economic sovereignty. This crisis is shattering that illusion. The kind of closure that investors want is institutionally prohibited in the eurozone.
There are three key components of the “durable” and comprehensive plan that Germany and France will likely present at the summit. First, it needs to find a more sustainable solution for Greece. Second, it must come to terms with the fact that some systemically important eurozone banks may need to be recapitalized. Third, it will likely propose ways to bolster the EFSF without members having to go back to parliaments to request more funds.
We have maintained consistently since the crisis began what is now becoming clearer to officials: That bondholders would have to eventually accept 50%-70% haircuts on Greek debt. The 21% haircut plan of July 21 was seen by many as only a partial down payment. Many, but not all, large European banks wrote down their Greek exposures by 50%. Several of those banks that provided reserves for 21% have come under more pressure recently. Some press reports suggest that German banks are preparing for 60% haircuts.
The ECB is the single largest holder of Greek government bonds. However, it refuses to participate in the “voluntary” scheme to make investors share some of the burden of adjustment. This means that the haircut needed in the private sector is actually larger the more that the ECB owns.
In any event, European officials hope that the larger haircut can re-establish a firewall around Greece and suggest that there won’t be other sovereign debt restructurings. This is one of the Achilles' Heels. If Greece can walk away from 50-70% of its debt, why shouldn’t Portugal and Ireland, not to mention Belgium, Spain and Italy, not seek some relief?
The EFSF’s institutional successor is the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), which was supposed to allow for orderly sovereign debt restructuring. It is supposed to come online in the July 2013, but there is movement among some eurozone officials to bring it forward by a year.
Recapitalizing Banks
If sovereign bond holders are going to “voluntarily” take substantial losses to avoid a Lehman-like debacle, some assurances are needed that banks will be recapitalized. How eurozone officials do this, given the conflicting positions of key stakeholders, may be another Achilles' Heel and prompt skepticism by the capital markets.
In the United States, banks appear to have been largely told how much capital they were going to request from the Treasury, which provided the same terms to everyone, the innocent and guilty, those that may have needed a capital infusion and those that may not have. It directly injected money into the banks, not by buying the distressed assets as initially conceived, but providing permanent capital in a way that also protected taxpayers. It avoided the ideological problem of the government having a vote on the bank boards, by acquiring preferred shares and long-term warrants.
Lacking sufficient institutional mechanisms, Europe is unlikely to duplicate the U.S. process and results. A greater burden is likely to fall on the members of the eurozone themselves. Of the core members, France is seen as in a particularly disadvantageous position relative to Germany. This helps explain why as the bank recapitalization talk increased and the euro appreciated and the basis swap (price of swapping euros for dollars) fell to four week lows, the spread between German and French 10-year yields widened to new EMU-era highs.
In fact, the correlation between the euro and the 10-year Germany-French spread has been inversely correlated (60-day rolling, percentage change), since the Greek debt crisis first flared up in late 2009. However, since early September inversion has become significantly less (from -0.55 early September to -0.22 in mid-October).
The greater the breadth (number of systemically important financial institutions covered) and depth (size of capital infusion) and more European (federal) the backstop for eurozone banks, the better the chances of success. European officials risk greater instability if a stigma is attached to participation (which is the advantage of forcing all critical institutions to partake). European officials also risk under-whelming the market if the proverbial bazooka turns out to be a water gun and officials fail to commit an overwhelming amount of resources. An ability to lift the burden from strictly national finances risks exacerbating the credit pressures on countries such as France.
EFSF

This is where the EFSF comes in. It can be used to help countries recapitalize their banks. There are various approaches that have been proposed, but the institutional and political constraints suggest that an insurance model may very well be the path of least resistance. By partially guaranteeing some part of new sovereign issuance, the EFSF would achieve the leverage that is necessary to ramp up the 440 billion fund without requiring new parliament votes.
The insurance model likely means that it will not be able to buy sovereign bonds in the secondary market as some have proposed, which would relieve the ECB of this unpleasant task. While some at the ECB may not be pleased, its continued involvement is an important element of support the financial system. Yet, paradoxically, the more success eurozone officials have at next week’s summit and at the G20 meeting in early November, the less the ECB’s purchases of sovereign bonds will be needed.
At the start of the debt crisis, there were powerful voices in Europe that opposed a role for the IMF. Those voices were ultimately, of course, outvoted and the IMF has played a significant role (and provided roughly 1/3 of the capital in the aid programs). Some European officials now seek an even greater role for the IMF.
The IMF’s Lagarde indicated last month that the Fund’s $390 billion in current lending power was insufficient for the demands it may face. Yet many key contributors are reluctant at this juncture to agree to a new capital raising exercise by the IMF. This may change if and when new formal requests for IMF programs are requested. Several of the large developing countries reportedly are more interested than, say, the U.S. and U.K. and this could lead to realignment of power within the IMF in the coming years.
Lastly, policy makers seem to believe that by focusing on repairing the financial system, they will win back the confidence of investors. Yet we suspect it will take more than that, while recognizing that it is no simple task either. The real challenge is the underlying source of the debt crisis, and one that remains un-addressed and off most radar screens: Sustaining aggregate demand. Debt allowed aggregate demand to be sustained in the face of weak wage and salary growth. What is going to replace it?

China... A Dragon Until 2020?

The latest NODX data is out for Singapore and we have contracted by 5%. It's the first sign of a recession looming. Exports to US and China softened the most. Two of the largest economies in the world. We have yet to approach the darkest hour in the economic cycle because the real cause of the current stock market flux is as much the lack of growth as it is the western financial fiasco.

Some people I met seem to think that we can avoid a recession even as the US is going through no growth and the EU plunge into a recession. The Singapore economy is one of the most sensitive to western GDP so I cannot find their opinion plausible.



China is a big country, inhabited by many Chinese.
-- Charles de Gaulle
Recently I took a long trip to China. It was quite an eye-opening experience. That's how I generally describe all of my China trips that I have taken every two years or so for the past 10 years. To paraphrase a famous saying, 'the more things change in China, the more they stay the same in the U.S.'
Make no mistake, China is still a developing country. But things are just more exciting over there. Take driving for example. Driving in China is the next best thing after going to war; you get 80% of the adrenaline rush with only 40% of the risk. Your average American chicken would never make it across the road. In fact, it'd be run over so fast, the question "why" wouldn't even come up. But once you figure out the game, you begin to see rules and etiquette of the road and it's not nearly as crazy and dangerous as it seems to an outsider. (Please bear with me on the winding route but I will get to investing before the end of this article.)
Actually, driving is a good metaphor illustrating the differences between the two societies. Things have been changing so fast in China that no codified rules or 'institutionalized' institutions could possibly keep up. It would be stupid for Chinese society to be too rigid and literal on rules. Instead, people keep their eyes open and improvise. On the other hand, the U.S. has been much more mature and stable in many ways, where the cost of improvisation on the go generally exceeds the benefit of flexibility.
This leads to my explanation why China experts in the west have been mostly wrong about China for centuries. Chinese society operates under very different circumstances that are rarely ever in sync with the west. This calls for a different set of assumptions and norms. One really must be very conscious about leaving behind preconceptions and judgmental tendencies in order to understand how things work there. Then one would see there's nothing mysterious or strange about the Chinese way. Everything actually makes sense, well, for the most part, sort of.
There has been a lot of attention focused on the Chinese economic outlook lately. Most of it is bearish, to say the least. Housing bubble, inflation, bad debt, soft global demand, hard landing. All of these are true; I saw/heard plenty of anecdotal evidence during my trip. And even China cannot escape the laws of economics. Except that the laws of economics in China are somewhat different.
Housing bubble? No question. But how badly can it go bust when the country of 1.3 billion people is at most 30% through the urbanization transition? Furthermore, there's no mortgage securitization, so the contagion effect is much simpler to track and control. The LTV [loan-to-value] range of mortgages is much higher, with much shorter duration and generally stringent lending. And there's a strong cultural bias towards paying off loans ASAP; people commit suicide for not being able to repay loans as a matter of cultural tradition and honor.
Some investors may lose some money, some banks may face some difficulty, that's about the worst it can get. It is emphatically not a systemic failure point. And you can safely ignore all the hysteria about ghost cities in China. No, they're real. But what's the problem? They're empty because the developers and banks choose them to be so. And they choose it to be so because there are little to no carrying costs. If life gets bad enough, people would just move in. As I said, what's the problem? Damn westerners, they whine about every little thing.
Inflation? Of course. And China's tolerance to inflation is lower than in the west because it's a saver's society. Wage pressure is definitely there: My anecdotal observation indicates a magnitude of 100% for skilled blue-collar labor since 2008. But mainstream media have been talking about the rising Chinese wage pressure since at least 2005. As to those talking about Chinese wages reaching parity with U.S. in a few years, I can only advise them to venture out of Beijing and Shanghai on the next trip. They might be surprised at how big and diverse the country is. Let's put things in perspective, shall we? We're talking about 6%, or maybe 10% if you refuse to believe official figures (higher in some regions for sure). Tell me about a crisis when it hits 20%.
Bad debt? Plenty, especially those guaranteed by local governments. But here's where the soft-law, improvisationist system may realize its advantages (see crazy driving in China). When the problem becomes undeniable, various arrangements could be made among banks, borrowers, local governments and the central government such that the can is either kicked down the road or hidden in the bush, or at worst, everyone shares some loss without spoiling the whole game. The parties could negotiate private settlements to avoid public liquidation with rigid time limits, move things off balance sheets or to another entity, etc. This is how they dealt with the massive (in relative terms) bad-debt problem in the late 90's. And same as then, as long as the economy stays relatively healthy, kicking the can down the road may not be quite as bad an idea as some think.
Though they are no competition to the western world, Chinese banks play their own game in China and they are masters at that. And don't go by the western book and think printing is the only option. There's a vast pool of ready funding in the form of unseen savings. In Wenzhou, a small, rich city not far from Shanghai, active underground private funding is estimated to be tens of billions of yuan. Multiply that by whatever you think is reasonable and suffice to say it's not a small number.
Soft global demand? Very likely, and very likely to last decades. China has little control here. But it's not entirely powerless either. In recent years China has been trying doggedly to lessen its reliance on exports. The effort is two-pronged. One is to boost domestic demand. Second is to diversify external demand through strategic investments all over the developing world. Success of the effort has been slow, but steady.
Hard landing? It's always a risk. But China has had a pretty impressive track record in avoiding it over the past 20 years. My personal experiences tell me that there's still some fuel left in the China growth engine. People are generally content and happy (I know, how could they, damn commies). There's still a huge pool of willing and able labor resources, huge needs for infrastructural investments, and huge reservoirs of real estate supply and demand to serve as a financial pivot in either direction. As always, this time could be different. But I think the odds for an "ok landing" are good.
Over the next few years, China may not be able to sustain the 8%+ growth rate the world has gotten used to over the past 20 years. Especially if the developed world remains in a slump, limping from crisis to crisis, as I expect. But it's likely to remain a star in relative terms, possibly the only star at times. The recent panic sell-off due to predictions of China growth slowing to 5% in five years was comical. I mean, where else can you find 5% growth after the U.S. exhausts the printing option, the Euro disappears, and the third European war begins to brew? The relatively primitive, closed, and improvisationist nature of the Chinese financial system turned out to be a life saver for China during the Asian financial crisis and the '08 crisis. That was no accident. And it will continue being the real source of limited decoupling and safeguard for China for the next few years. And that's no accident, either. OK, I'll go dissolve into the flurry of peach flowers now.
Beyond 2020, however, my China outlook becomes very grim.
The first pillar of my long-term pessimism in China is the same as my current pessimism in the west, namely baby-boomer retirement. China's baby-boom started in the early 60's and the ensuing retirement wave starts around 2020. And the cut-off in age distribution is extremely abrupt due to the birth-control policy first enforced in the 70's. Some cultural and societal differences may help lessen the pain. But I'm of the conviction that nothing short of a technological revolution can fight demographics. The only hope is that, by 2020, the developed world may be bottoming out from the lost decades of baby-boomer retirement; Japan very likely, the U.S. maybe, Europe is more uncertain.
The second pillar is a new observation as far as I know: The reason for the apparent lack of innovative force in China is systemic and is deeply embedded in the socio-economic structure. It has little to do with the political system (at least not directly), even less with ideology, and nothing racial. I will elaborate below.
A healthy, sustainable economy needs a proper mix of specialists and generalists. Specialists directly drive innovation and implementation, while generalists do all the other things. Specialists tend to be individual contributors and, as such, need to be compensated in money and/or motivated with respect and pride. For all the cynicism about the U.S. not making anything except prostitutes and beer, there's still reasonable space for many types of specialists in the U.S. They take pride in their work. And they're generally well respected and paid for for what they do.
China has a long tradition of respecting specialists, though not all the same types nor in the same ways as in Europe. But that tradition has been washed away by the tide of rapid socio-economic transformation of late. The current benchmark for social success in China is such that if you are not a manager or boss of some sort by the age of 40, you're a loser. As a result, most capable people start to focus on climbing the corporate/government ladder after turning 30, willingly or not, with fitting talent or otherwise. During this trip I met many dozens of old friends, from high school to graduate school. With the exception of a few entrepreneurs, nobody, none are doing specialist work. I was appalled. I still am. And it gets more pathetic for the younger generation; the dream job for recent college graduates is civil service.
In a modern economy, white-collar labor before age 30 is statistically a negative productivity group. Society pays more for their on the job training than it gets from their actual work. The peak productivity years are from age 40 to 50.
So, what's been happening in China over the past 20 years (and especially the last 5-10 years) is that the society has systematically cleansed itself of innovative forces and molded them into either generalists or waste. This is a tragedy and China will pay for it dearly. So far it's not been much of a problem, only because the Chinese economy is mostly at the lower end of the value chain. Infrastructure, adequately skilled blue-collar labor, generalists who facilitate the flow of people/finance/material/info -- these things have more immediate impact than innovation. But China cannot go on forever staying at the lower end of the value chain. The lower end of the global value chain simply isn't big enough to feed China forever. At some point, China needs to migrate up the chain, similar to Japan and Korea, only on a much bigger scale and with more diversity/complexity. But I don't see how this is possible.
China has been strangling itself 10 years down the road.
There are many other potential problems, of course, among them increasing economic disparity and decreasing economic mobility. But I consider them either secondary or more solvable compared to the two factors I mentioned above.
If you're short China now, e.g., via FXI, good luck and be ready to jump. But I'll be with you in 10 years.
As a note of caution, I did find a flock of black swans in JiuZhaiGou, a beautiful national park and nature's wonder in the high mountains of Sichuan. Consider yourself warned, including things of infinite improbability.

Tuesday 18 October 2011

Divergence Between Equity and Credit Markets

There you have it. The sacrifice for Germany is just to big to bail out Greece. Germany would prefer to let Greece default and recapitalise their own banks. Why contribute money to the European Financial Stability Fund (EFSF) to bail out the ungrateful and ill-disciplined Greeks with no known payback period? It's like throwing good money after bad. They'd rather the private sector (banks) take a 60% haircut and each country recapitalise their own banks. France prefers the EFSF bailout money because they aren't as rich as Germany. This is a problem whereby the richest country must sacrifice for the poorest. It's robbing Peter to save Paul.

The most important story as we head into the new week - from Bloomberg:

Germany said European Union leaders won’t provide the complete fix to the euro-area debt crisis that global policy makers are pushing for at an Oct. 23 summit. German Chancellor Angela Merkel has made it clear that “dreams that are taking hold again now that with this package everything will be solved and everything will be over on Monday won’t be able to be fulfilled,” Steffen Seibert, Merkel’s chief spokesman, said at a briefing in Berlin today. The search for an end to the crisis “surely extends well into next year.”

Since the stock markets bottomed on October 4th, the S&P 500 has rallied nearly 14% in less than two weeks. Given the strength of the rally one would expect to see other markets confirm such a dramatic move. However, this is not the case as the credit markets do not show the same enthusiasm with credit spreads still elevated in the face of economic and financial risk. One of these markets is wrong and one is right, with a resolution ahead.
Mixed Messages
After Friday ’s close the S&P 500 has retraced a fair amount of its prior decline and is now back up to the top of its trading range since August, and is down 2.63% year-to-date. It seems hope springs eternal as rumors of Europe taking swifter action ahead of their banking and sovereign debt crises gives the global equity markets a bid. It will be interesting to see what the S&P 500 does from here as it is bottom-up against resistance and some kind of pullback should be expected.
[click to enlarge]

Source: StockCharts.com
While the market's advance over the last two weeks has been perceived by many to give the all-clear in terms of European financial risk or a US recession ahead, I wouldn’t be so sure. What should give investors pause is that leading economic indicators often act coincidentally with the stock market, meaning they tend to move in concert as both discount future economic trends. Thus, when they do not move in harmony it typically means one of the two is about to play catch up with the other.
Shown below is the Economic Cycle Research Institute’s (ECRI) Weekly Leading Index (WLI) which shows a negative 9.6% smoothed growth rate, a level last seen in the mild 2001 recession as well as in early 2008 and the middle of 2010. With readings this negative it isn’t surprising the ECRI is calling for another recession (“U.S. Economy Tipping into Recession”), their first recession call since 2008. While many were calling for another recession last year given the weak WLI, ECRI actually stated we would skirt a recession as their longer-leading indicators were still heading up. Now their WLI, which is more of an intermediate indicator, is moving in the same direction as their long-leading indicators with both heading south, which is why they are making a high-conviction recession call this time around.
[click to enlarge]

Source: Bloomberg
As seen above, the two prior periods of divergence proved to be key turning points in the market. In 2007 the WLI continued to head south while the S&P 500 rallied into October. Closing out the year the S&P 500 caught up with the WLI as it was correctly forecasting a major turn in the economy ahead of what the S&P 500 was discounting. Likewise, at the end of the last bear market and recession the WLI bottomed in 2008 ahead of the March 2009 bottom in the S&P 500 and was forecasting future improvement in the economy. Last year when the S&P 500 rallied after its summer correction, so too did the WLI fail to confirm the market’s move. So, the fact that the S&P 500 has rallied nearly 14% since its low earlier in the month and yet the WLI has continued to decline should give equity investors pause as the two have, once again, diverged.
Not only are leading economic indicators not confirming the stock market’s move, neither are the credit markets. Shown below is the S&P 500 on the top panel and below are several bond market credit spreads, inverted for directional similarity. As you can see, last year when the stock market advanced after its summer correction various bond spreads began to contract to signal credit risk was easing. Credit risk began to pick up again in the middle of this year just as the stock market was peaking. Please note, however, that while the S&P 500 has been in a trading range since August, each rally we've experienced has not been confirmed by easing credit spreads, leading to a subsequent failure to breakout of the trading range in each case. Since the S&P 500 peak this summer, we have just witnessed one of the largest uninterrupted rallies, and since we have seen virtually no improvement in credit spreads, I think this rally is highly suspect and investors should remain cautious.
[click to enlarge]

Source: Bloomberg
In addition to bond market credit spreads not confirming the stock market, neither are bank overnight lending rates which continue to rise even in the face of a sharply rising stock market. Back in June 2010 overnight lending rates peaked as credit risk began to stabilize and then in July and August overnight lending rates plummeted and global financial risks began to subside. This time around overnight lending rates for European and U.S. banks continue to climb and show no sign of stabilization.
[click to enlarge]

Source: Bloomberg
Until we see the leading economic indicators and the credit markets singing the same tune as the stock market, the recent stock market rally should be viewed with a great deal of skepticism.
Disclosure: I have no positions in any stocks mentioned, and no plans to initiate any positions within the next 72 hours.

Monday 17 October 2011

Long Trudge for the West But Emerging Economies Will Eventually Save the Day

How to resolve the European Problem... Well Sort Of

The situation in Europe is grave. It's exactly the situation in Asia in 1997 - 98. The PIIGS' fiscal deficits are so huge that the bond vigilantes are attacking their bonds. Yields for Greek debt reached 70% at some stage for 3 year bonds. While the coupons have been decided before the yields rose, this means Greece certainly cannot issue new debt. The problem is Greece needs to issue bigger and bigger amounts of new debts. The situation is spreading to the other European countries too. The reason that it resembles the Asian Financial Crisis was that like the Korea, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand which could not service their debt denominated in USD, the European countries could not print the EUR currencies.

The solution back in 1997 was to get a haircut for the Asian debt in exchange for opening up their economies to the rest of the world. It taught the Asian countries a lesson about borrowing money to spend which they cannot repay.

Now even if the PIIGS can balance their books immediately, they will still be in peril because the bond yields may rise to levels that cannot be repaid. It will be like loan shark rates of 10 - 30% per annum. The solution should be to get the ECB to print money and buy up all the bonds that the PIIGS wish to issue. That may mean the EUR crashing and further more, who wish to have a balance sheet full of bonds that will be worthless in future? The biggest countries, such as Germany and France will obviously suffer because they probably contributed the most to ECB.

Can the Greeks reasonably pay off all the debts without defaulting, if ECB buys off all their debt? It could ask for a hair cut from the private sector so that ECB doesn't need to buy so much of the debt and threaten the EUR. This is precisely what's happening. A 60% haircut is talked about and this will kill the European banks and any other bank that held or sold insurance protecting against default of Greek debt.

So the solution is a hotch potch of sacrifice of the private sector and the EUR. I expect EUR to come down to 1.45 against SGD by 2013/14 and gold to shoot up beyond USD2500/oz in the same period. I also expect inflation to rise to 3-4% in Eurozone.

What the PIIGS Must Do On Their Part

Any country wallowing in debt must do the obvious: increase taxes and cut spending. But the paradox is when you cut government spending, you may slow down the economy so much that tax collections fall. So the obvious solution is to reform the economy like the Asian countries did. EU must dismantle the social welfare system, liberalise its labour law and allow wealthy non-EU citizens and corporations to invest without hinderance.

Does the EU have the policial will to do so? We already witnessed riots on the streets in Greece. We could see more riots if the austerity measures set in for other European countries as well. We could see turbulent times ahead. But it is very unfair that the world gathers round to save the socialist Europeans when they just lectured and demanded Asians to reform back in 1997.

There is good debt and bad debt. Good debt is when you borrow to invest in infrastructure, education, housing, basically, things that will yield long-term returns in future. A country that invests in good road networks, rail roads and airports will enable more tourists to visit the country, facilitate transportation of people to and from work more easily, raise the real estate prices. A country that invests in education will cultivate a workforce that will be more productive, be able to invent more things in future.

Bad debt is when you borrow to pay welfare benefits, to provide free healthcare that results in wastages, to expand the civil service sector so that masked unemployment occurs.

The west has put too much good money after bad situations... They don't have the fiscal option to stimulate the economy out of a recession. They don't have the political will to weane their electorates out of the welfare system. I do not think the EU as a region can emerge out of a recession in 2012, or indeed in 2013. Even if they did, recovery will be very weak and a bit like Japan's. The best case scenario is where Greece defaults and most major banks recapitalised by the EU and perhaps by the US (I suspect many American banks sold insurances for Greek debt).


QE Cannot Save the World

I am doubtful if QE3 can prevent a global recession. The western world is deleveraging and wages are not growing. A massive QE may not stimulate lending because they is no demand. EU certainly won't import more from the US. The ROW is not ready to take up this slack, not for the next 2 - 3 years. I expect global economy to increase by 0.9% in 2012 and 1.9% in 2013. It will be quite similar to growth in 2008. We may see the world's stock indices start to pick up by the mid 2012 to late 2012.

But Emerging Countries Will...

The EM 10 group comprising BRIC, Indonesia, Turkey, Mexico, Taiwan and Saudi will surpass the EU as the biggest economy in the world in 2012. They will form 26% of the world's economy by 2013 and reach 30% by 2016. They will grow between 2 - 3% between 2012 - 13. By 2014 - 15, EM 10 will start to grow by between 3 - 6% per annum. EU and the US, which comprised 49% of the world's GDP in 2011, will see their share fall to 43% in 2013. By 2020, EM 10 will surpass EU and US in importance. It will be a transition period for the next 5 years but we will reach the Super-Cycle soon. I've even factored in a hard landing in China where a financial crisis occurs.

Saturday 15 October 2011

I do not toss around the idea of a market crash lightly. If you've been following me long enough, you know that only in very rare instances do I issue a cautionary Alert (I've only issued four since my website launched in 2008), and I am generally not given to hyperbole.

Let's be clear: I'm not issuing an Alert at this time. But I am concerned that a materially adverse disruption to the financial markets is increasingly likely in the near future.

Perhaps a definition will be helpful as we begin. A 'market crash' is an event where there are no bids to meet a wall of selling. The actual amount of the percentage decline is less important to note than the amount of chaos, or loss of control, that a given market experiences. Some like to say that a market downdraft requires a decline of 10%, or maybe even 15% or 20% (or more), in order to qualify as a 'crash.' For me, the key factor is not so much the amount of the decline, but the pace of the decline.

With perhaps a quadrillion US dollars of hyper-interconnected derivatives outstanding -- that's the notional value, but who really knows what the real number is? -- an orderly market is essential for knowing whether or not the counterparty to one's trade is solvent. During periods of intense price swings in the market, such things are simply not knowable, and spawn the fear and paralysis that really define a market crash.

The Next Market Crash

Like everybody, I have no idea when the next market crash will occur, but I do happen to hold the view that a market crash is on the way. In fact, my view is that the entire future from here onward will be marked by sharp plunges (both crashes and regular market declines), followed by periods of stability, if not apparent recovery.

What I track instead are imbalances and risks. Sort of like being a fire marshal who takes note of an outlet with fifteen things plugged into it, some with frayed cords, located near a pile of old cleaning rags. I can't tell you for sure that a fire will result, only that the odds are elevated. A prudent person will take steps to remedy the situation or at least prepare for the possibility of a fire.
Here's one view of the possible trigger for the next meltdown from Dr. Robert Shapiro, advisor to Presidents Clinton and Obama, and now the IMF, as offered on BBC Newsnight on October 5, 2011:

"If they cannot address this [the sovereign debt crisis in Europe] in a credible way, I believe within perhaps two to three weeks, we will have a meltdown in sovereign debt which will produce a meltdown across the European banking system.

We're not just talking about a relatively small Belgian bank, we're talking about the largest banks in the world. The largest banks in Germany, the largest banks in France that will spread to the UK in part through the sovereign debt problems in Ireland.

It will spread everywhere because the global financial system is so interconnected, all those banks are counterparties to every significant bank in the US and in Britain, and in Japan and around the world. This would be a crisis, in my view, more serious than the crisis in 2008."
(Source)
What he's warning about here are two main things. The first is the risk of contagion, where problems in one area spread to another because everything is so intertwined. The second is that you can count on the rot spreading from the weaker periphery to the stronger core. Crisis always progresses from the outside in.

That dynamic has been playing out for months, and it should be obvious to the most casual of observers that the Greece situation has not been improved one iota by any of the steps yet taken.
The stakes could not be higher. Normally staid politicians are letting their guard down and saying previously unthinkable things. For example, this shocker recently came from the Polish finance minister:

Poland warns of war 'in 10 years' as EU leaders scramble to contain panic

Oct 14, 2011

Speaking to MEPs in Strasbourg on Wednesday morning (14 Sept) [the Polish finance minister] warned of the need to act rapidly to prevent grave danger for the EU. Making reference to a recent report entitled 'Euro Break Up - The Consequences' by Swiss financial giant UBS, he declared: "There is no doubt we are in danger. Europe is in danger".

The paper by UBS, normally known for its highly sober analysis, warned that historically, monetary unions do not break up without civil war or some other form of authoritarian reaction. "The risk of civil disorder questions the rule of law, and as such basic issues such as property rights. Even those countries that avoid internal strife and divisions will likely have to use administrative controls to avoid extreme positions in their markets", it said.

The Polish minister went on to warn of a doubling of unemployment within two years "even in the rich countries".

He concluded his comments by recollecting a recent conversation he had with an old friend who is now head of a major bank: "We were talking about the crisis in eurozone. He told me 'You know, after all these political shocks, economic shocks, it is very rare indeed that in the next 10 years we could avoid a war'. A war ladies and gentlemen. I am really thinking about obtaining a green card for my kids in the United States".
(Source)
I'm not sure whether the US will be a much better place to ride out the storm if the European banking system collapses, as it will be only a matter of time before the US is exposed as being just as financially and fiscally ruined as the EU.
Supporting this view is a rather famous Harvard economist (and the probable successor for Bernanke's current position, according to some rumors):

Martin Feldstein says there's a "nontrivial" chance the U.S. economy will turn down again and calls the recovery "about as bad an expansion as I've ever seen."

Another downturn here will further expose the fact that there are still towers of tottering debt that can only be serviced by an expansion, and a robust one at that. With this next revelation of systemic weakness, expect more debt defaults, institutional failures, and the same sort of banking weakness seen in Europe to occur in the US.

In short, there's every chance here that an even worse repeat of 2008 could happen at any time. And in my estimation, the chance that this will come in the form of a market crash is too high to ignore.
Right now, with the rot creeping from the outside in, I see those chances as not only high, but rising.

From the Outside In

It can be very difficult to envision what an 'outside in' crisis looks and feels like. In order to get a better feel for the dynamic, we turn to Phoenix, Arizona for an excellent case study.

Once the darling of the housing boom, with endless desert building lots enabling the most egregious sort of bubble sprawl, Phoenix is now in the grips of a horrific housing crash. Like all big adjustments, it appears to those experiencing it to be in slow motion:

Phoenix-area real estate collapse echoed troubles

Oct 9, 2011
A look at metro Phoenix's foreclosure crisis over the past five years shows an economic crash moving through time and space.

The collapse started in new-housing areas on the fringes and then swept inward, hitting more established areas as the unemployment rate climbed. Now, as the stock market struggles and speculation swirls about another recession, foreclosures are flaring in the Valley's luxury-home neighborhoods.
(Source)
That's a perfect illustration of the 'outside in' dynamic. At the beginning of the bubble's burst, it was almost certainly unthinkable to the inhabitants of the wealthier neighborhoods that they would get swept up in the cataclysm. But they did -- first the weaker and more distant locales, then the middle-strength ones, and then the core.
The article continues:

A new Arizona Republic analysis, which maps out every home in default in the region over the past five years, is the first comprehensive look at the wave of foreclosures that has swept the Valley since the market began its steep decline in 2007.

The analysis, based on data from Phoenix foreclosure-information service AZ Bidder, plots individual foreclosures and overall trends by year.
It shows how the Valley's foreclosure crisis was more than one crisis. Foreclosures arose in waves, driven first by problematic mortgages, then by the job woes of the recession and now by lingering economic effects being felt in expensive neighborhoods.
(Source)
It wasn't just caused by housing weakness alone, but the way that housing weakness led to job weakness, and how they ended up preying together on confidence in the bubble and ultimately dragging down the local economy.

One more perfect passage from that article that illustrates our point:

As Phoenix's foreclosure crisis crept inward from the fringes during late 2008, it was being driven not just by subprime lending but also by the economy at large.

The state and the nation had fallen into a recession. Hundreds of thousands of jobs, many in the construction industry, were lost in Arizona.

As metro Phoenix's unemployment rate climbed, so did foreclosures. The number of borrowers losing Phoenix-area houses to lenders hit a record in 2009.

Foreclosures began to affect communities closer in, where less speculation and new building had taken place. Chandler, Gilbert and Glendale, as well as central and north Phoenix, began to see foreclosures climb and home values fall.
(Source)
Similarly, the European debt crisis began in the weakest locales first (Ireland and Greece), then infected the middle countries (Portugal, Italy, and Spain) and now threatens to overrun the core (Germany and France). A wave of sovereign defaults will sweep across the region, progressing from the outside in with a self-sustaining and self-reinforcing dynamic, unless somehow stopped.
That's the important risk to focus on. And whether the crisis is a little one or one that ends in everyone's worst fear -- another war on the Continent -- remains to be seen. But the probability of an approaching market calamity is non-trivial. So that brings us to the main insight we are trying to convey here: We need to be prepared for a major market clearing event that finally allows the rot to be cleared from the system.

Progressive Failure

The problem in Europe is very far from resolved at this point, the recent happy noises about Belgium nationalizing part of Dexia bank notwithstanding. As an aside on that matter, I found this to be quite interesting:

Belgium nationalizes part of Dexia bank for $5.4B

Oct 10, 2011
The Belgian state will buy the national subsidiary of embattled bank Dexia for euro4 billion ($5.4 billion) and provide tens of billions of euros in new guarantees as part of a wider bailout of the lender, the first victim of a new squeeze in European credit markets.

On top of the nationalization, the governments of Belgium, France and Luxembourg together will provide an additional euro90 billion ($121 billion) in funding guarantees for the bank for up to 10 years.

Belgium will provide 60.5 percent of these guarantees, 36.5 percent will come from France and the remaining 3 percent from Luxembourg.
(Source)
This means Belgium is potentially on the hook for $78.6 billion in bailout funds for a single institution, which amounts to 17% of GDP (2010 figure). To put this into perspective for our US readers, that would be the equivalent of the USA guaranteeing $2.6 trillion...for a single bank. Anybody care to guess whether the amount that they decided to guarantee will be ultimately sufficient to cover the actual amount of the total potential losses? My guess is that over time the number will prove to be far, far below the final and true cost.

Even if the Dexia situation has been temporarily stabilized, Greece has not, and this is where the Europe story really begins. With Greek ten-year notes over 24%, two-year notes of 75%, and one-year notes over 150%, there is virtually no chance of anything happening other than a Greek default.
A writedown of Greek debt is inevitable here; the only question is, how much? Here's the current view:

Europe Divided on Greek Writedowns That Juncker Says May Top 60%

Oct 11, 2011
European Central Bank President Jean-Claude Trichet said Europe’s debt crisis now threatens the region’s financial system as officials race to put together a new plan to end the turmoil.

“The crisis has reached a systemic dimension,” Trichet told lawmakers in Brussels today in his capacity as head of the European Systemic Risk Board. “Sovereign stress has moved from smaller economies to some of the larger countries. The crisis is systemic and must be tackled decisively.”

European leaders are trying to shore up the region’s banks as they debate how best to manage the fallout from any Greek default. Governments yesterday pushed back a summit amid opposition to Germany’s drive for deeper-than-planned Greek bond writedowns that Luxembourg’s Jean-Claude Juncker says may exceed 60 percent.

“Time is always of the essence when you have to be in a mode of crisis management,” said Trichet.
(Source)
A 'writedown' is just another of many more pleasant-sounding terms that are being used instead of 'default,' which is precisely what Greece will soon be doing.

With the triggering of a default, the fear of contagion will spread, because, frankly, nobody really knows where the time bombs are located in the credit default swap (CDS derivative) markets. Sure, we can know roughly who is holding what, but each of these holdings is then linked to the primary institutions' own credit ratings, which themselves have vast piles of CDS paper attached to them. In other words, everything is so interconnected that it's nearly impossible for anyone, even the owners of these derivatives, to conduct an accurate risk-assessment or predict how they're going to behave during a market dislocation.

These in turn are held by other institutions and funds, which are heavily leveraged and exposed to the very same market forces that will assure that the exact opposite of hedging will erupt during the hairiest part of the coming rout.

For perspective, Greece has nearly 330 billion euros ($445 billion) of debt outstanding, on top of which CDS paper has been layered. That is, if Greek debt gets a 60% haircut, the basement-level losses we can expect as a result are $270 billion, but the CDS paper will certainly amplify that number much higher for some unlucky institutions.

For even more perspective, consider that Spain and Italy have nearly $3.4 trillion in debt, making their combined predicament worth about 7.5 Greek dramas.

If you think the big banks represent the smart money, I would remind you that when the subprime CDS disaster finally blew up, it was the big banks (and AIG) that were holding the bag -- supposedly the smartest of the smart money. I somehow doubt they are going to be any smarter this time.

The contagion fear here is that several mega banks (and/or funds) will fail as a result of these cross-correlated and therefore unhedged bets. When the European Banking Authority ran their stress tests a while back, several very large banks in Spain and France barely passed, and that was without booking any losses on any of their outstanding loans to Greece, Ireland, or Portugal. If one tips over, so will the rest, because they all owe each other.

To simplify, here's a picture of the world banking system as it currently stands:
Another form of contagion will come with the thought that if one major Western economy can default, others can, too. A precedent will have been set, and other over-indebted economies will suffer higher interest rates on their borrowing as a result. The thing about higher interest rates is that once they are past a certain level, they become self-fulfilling prophecies, virtually assuring that default is a mathematical inevitability (see Greece, above). Over the long haul, interest rates over the long haul cannot be higher than the nominal rate of GDP growth, generally speaking. In today's low-growth environment, that is a low bar, indeed; perhaps just 2%-3%.

A final concern for European banks (in particular) concerns bank runs, in which institutional and retail depositors decide to flee a given bank, causing it to topple over, as the first domino in a long line.

The bottom line here is that the European situation is quite far from resolved, and as we've been saying all along, it really can't until large losses are taken by someone. For now, the banks are trying desperately to convince the world that the losses should be shared by everyone through the miracle of inflation (with central banks printing money, a.k.a. "quantitative easing" or QE, to buy the bad debts off the banks) while the people of various countries are increasingly protesting this regrettable practice of socializing banks' losses, yet allowing privatized profits.

Expect Volatility

The key point to understand about our economy is that it is anything but straightforward and linear. It is a complex system, meaning that it has two characteristics of which we should be aware: It requires energy to maintain and/or increase its complexity, and it is unpredictable.
One typical feature of complex systems is that they tend to jump rather abruptly from one state to the next. Where they can exist in some sort of seeming equilibrium for quite a while, a sufficient exogenous shock (or a change in conditions, such as becoming energy-starved) can often cause them to transition rather suddenly to the next point of 'equilibrium'.

Said more simply, systems often have tipping points, where they no longer react to insults proportionally, but chaotically and sometimes violently. Phoenix, Arizona was coasting along just fine until experiencing a tipping point in its housing market that involved both the job market and the broader economy, dragging both down on the way to finding a new and much lower equilibrium point.

Focus on Positioning Yourself Prudently

What we have here is an ideal set of conditions for a tipping point to arise in our financial system. When such a tipping point occurs, you should expect wild volatility in the markets and be prepared for things to be moving far too quickly to react to with any sort of precision or grace.
That's why it's best to be pre-positioned in your financial, physical, and emotional preparations, so that when the next bout of extreme volatility exerts itself, little to no immediate action is needed on your part during the tumult.

Ride out the chaos in safety and confidence. Be a support to those less prepared within your family and community. And take advantage of the luxury few will have to plan your next steps carefully, once the corrective forces clear much of the current uncertainty out of the markets. Doing so will set you up better than most to prosper in the aftermath.

Tuesday 11 October 2011

A Bear Trap or a Start of a Bull?

The Bearish Case

As we outlined in detail on October 5, a quick fix to satisfy the markets is unlikely to materialize in Europe. According to the Wall Street Journal:


“The news stories about a big-bang recapitalization of EU banks are overdone,” says Sony Kapoor of Re-Define, a financial think tank he has set up. “The EU has neither the money, nor the political will for action on such a scale.” Indeed, German Chancellor Angela Merkel implicitly recognized in Brussels on Wednesday that there is no consensus that a European-wide recapitalization is necessary, points out Stephen Lewis of Monument Securities in London. The German government was ready to recapitalize German banks, she said, “if there is a general view that the banks are not sufficiently capitalized.”

Bloomberg notes bank recapitalization does not address the root of the problems in Europe:


Even a recapitalization of European banks may fail to reassure investors because they will still question the ability of governments to meet their borrowing costs. Injecting capital into Europe’s banks won’t provide the “silver bullet” that is needed to solve the crisis, said Huw van Steenis, a banking analyst at Morgan Stanley in London. It needs to be done in conjunction with measures to shore up sovereign debt, he said. “The banking crisis isn’t going to be resolved until the sovereign crisis is resolved,” said David Watts, a strategist at CreditSights Inc. in London. “Capital isn’t the way to go because the needs are too big and will weaken the sovereign.” Banks would need to raise about 148 billion euros in the event of a 60 percent writedown on their holdings of Greek debt, 40 percent for Portugal and Ireland and 20 percent for Italy and Spain, Kian Abouhossein a JPMorgan Chase & Co. analyst, wrote in a note to clients Sept. 26.

The bears have control of both the short and long-term trends. The chart below is as of Thursday’s close. There is nothing particularly bullish about it. Price is below the 50-day (red); it closed below the 20-day (blue) on Friday. Both the 50-day and 20-day have negative slopes, which is bearish. The green parallel trendlines have impacted price since early April - they all have bearish slopes. The pink parallel trendlines have impacted price since the August 8 low - they, too, have bearish slopes. Price faces possible resistance from the 50-day and the twin trendlines near 1,181.

Resistance

Commodities and precious metals have been flashing deflationary and bearish signals in recent months. Stocks and commodities did not perform well in the period August-November 2008. Using this link, compare the chart of the silver ETF SLV in 2008 to the present day. The charts give specific bull/bear levels to monitor in SLV.

The Dexia Bank bailout highlights the scope of the problems with bad debt. Dexia ironically passed the recent stress tests with flying colors; according to the Financial Times “it not only passed the exercise, it emerged as one of the safest banks in Europe”. Bloomberg reported on October 8:


While France and Belgium have rushed to protect their local units, hurdles to an agreement remain as they wrestle over responsibility for assets hit by the crisis that has caused the bank’s short-term funding to evaporate. Dexia’s troubled assets are being folded into a “bad bank” and could amount to as much as 190 billion euros ($256 billion).

The S&P 500 stalled on Friday at logical resistance levels after Italy’s and Spain’s debt ratings were cut. The ratings changes brought the problems in Europe back to the forefront of investors’ minds. If the bears maintain control of the market, we will continue to favor a menu of deflation-friendly assets as outlined on October 4, including bonds (TLT), the dollar (UUP), and shorts (SH).

Monday 10 October 2011

There Must Be A Solution and Other Observations

I need to find a way out of some of my health ailments. I'm not very healthy. At 40, at times, I feel that I'm one foot in the grave. At times, I can't even get up from bed coz my body's aching. I'm about to embark on an experimental drug to try to get relief from my ailments. I don't know if it will help. I will try anything that will make my loved ones feel better, and make me a more productive and useful person.

As for observations, my trip to Taipei enlightened me. The infrastructure in Taipei was an eye opener. The subway was world class. The subway malls connect one station to another and the underground facility was first class. Singapore should have more of such underground malls, especially those that connect Clark Quay to Raffles Place, which allows people form the Circle Line to walk in the cool comforts of an air conditioned environment to walk to Raffles Place. Orchard Road is another place where the underground subway malls can connect from Orchard to Sommerset to Dhoby Gaut to City Hall. Clean, orderly, the people were civic minded and kept to the right side of the escalator at all times. The young gave up their seats to the elderly, parents with kids and the pregnant immediately. I've never seen that kind of civic mindedness in Singapore. It's shameful that you see people stealing the seats reserved for the handicapped in Singapore. Perhaps the massive, indiscriminate immigration policy of the government here has destroyed the social fabric. Perhaps the SOME foreigners who come here have no regard for civic mindedness. As a result, Singaporeans don't care as well. I'm not against foreign talent, make no mistakes. They boost our retail sales, push up our home prices and attract MNCs to situate here. But I'm against indisciminate immigration. The foreigners must be truly talented whether via work experience or via superior academic records.

As for infrastructure, Taipei is chaotic. There was no real city centre. The pavements were minimal, the ground almost always chipped. There were no real cluster of food places, nor clusters of night life. They were just scattered all over. The only real food cluster was Yong Kang street where I could eat good beef noodles and fried chicken steaks. The other good food was the usual Ting3 Tai4 Fung1 in the malls. In most night markets, I could see lots of litters. Hygiene was suspect because I had LS several times. Most of the food were street food. In terms of shopping, I preferred Bangkok, Singapore, even Tokyo / Osaka to Taipei. Even Seoul and Camden in London was better.

It was a mixed experience in Taipei. The constant bell ring from my office mail did not help as I was called to resolve one issue after another. I could not really get my mind off work completely. In any case, I've had my break and it's now back to taking care of my clients the best I could till my next break, which will probably be London in January to visit relatives and look at some properties in what will probably be another big, deep recession.

Apologies for Not Being Able to Reply

I can't seem to reply comments made on my posts. I've had one comment asking me about whether Asian bonds are a good hiding place. My answer is, "it all depends". If you're just gonna hold on to yields, dividends, coupons, whatever, and don't care about mark-to-market losses, then go ahead. But if you wanna make some real returns; i.e. capital gains + yields, then don't.

The reason is simple, I won't touch convertible bonds, pref shares at this stage. Euro pref shares have a high chance on not paying dividends, although I don't think any major Euro bank will default. But there will be massive mark to market losses, mark my words. the last 3 weeks have seen massive outflows from emerging market local and foreign currency debts.

Gold is very volatile. I will cap it at no more than 30% of the portfolio. If the recession cannot prevent a deflation, like in Japan, then I'm sorry, gold may fall by 35% like it did in 2008. So far it has fallen by 20% so there may be 15% more downside to go. But there's a caveat; gold fell by 35% prior to QE1. In this age of QE, gold may not have such downside.

I like CTA. I continue to believe that CTAs like Winton and Man AHL Trend will achieve 10 - 20% in a bear market. Nothing makes money in distress like trend followers that can short all assets. I am shorting myself. I've shorted Direxion Triple US Small Caps from 60 to 35 now. That's a very decent return over 6 months.

Sunday 9 October 2011

Why I Think A Rebound of 10% or More May Occur

There were 4 big bear markets (> 30% drops) in the US; 1987, 2000, 2008 and now.

1987, the fall of 36% occured within 3 trading days. It took about 3 years to recover the losses. Hence my theory is that stock markets fall more than 3 times faster than it rises. Even I would find it difficult to cut with minimal losses. I would have sold my stocks at around 20% down at best.



2000 - 2003:

The tech bubble took a long time to unfold. From the peak some time in Jan 2000, the Dow and S&P500 fell by around Apr 2003. It took about 3.5 years to unfold with lots of rebound. In fact by Aug 2001, the Dow fell from 12000 to 10500 and you still would not be sure if we are in a bear. However, the 150 D EMA of 10800 showed the Dow fluctuating between 12000 to 10500 for 1.75 years, around 12 - 13% trading range, alternating between bull and bear territories for sometime. This should be another warning to investors that stocks are in trouble. When 9/11 came, it was another 20% down. Another warning sign is the 150 D EMA dipping downwards. Never buy when this happens.

2008:

The last 4 years has been the age of financial crisis. Oct 2007 was the peak of the S&P500. 7 months later, there was a huge rebound to keep the downside from the peak at 10%. However, it was the last chance to exit. After May 2008, markets continued to trend lower before they capitulate in Oct 2008.

Conclusion:

My take is that we usually have better exit points for equities up to 7 to 8 months after the highest point. But if those chances are not taken, we could suffer huge falls. Our experience in 1987 showed that it could not be avoided because the crash took place over 3 days. But the crashes in 2000, 2008 and now will probably give us opportunities to exit with around 10% losses.

Get out early, get out on rebounds. If unsure, stay sidelined and do bonds, do CTAs.

We Are In a Bear That May Last Till Mid 2012

This is a post that I feel is helpful for those who still think we are not in a bear market and things are going to get a lot better. Most indices have pierced below the 200 Day Moving Averages and at high volume. I believe that it won't be a straight line down and there will be huge rebounds along the way. In my next post I'll show you some charts of a bear market unfolding.

My point is, there may be a rebound lasting until Dec 2011 and you may recover 10% from this low. So hang on there.


What The Euro Crisis Tells Us About Market Bottoms


With the coming of October and Q3, the markets are quickly approaching 2010 support levels. Looking at the last 12 months, equities both here and in Europe have seen declines that suggest a bear market.
With regards to the Europe 350 index, it has seen declines of 30.6% off of its 2011 highs. This is due in part to the poor response by their policy makers of handling the sovereign debt situation, as well as the uncertainty that holds much of the world captive at this point. The S&P 500, on the other hand, has seen a less pronounced loss compared to its European counterparts. The 18.6% decline witnessed earlier this month borders the 20% bear market threshold; however, it has not yet been breached.
The domestic situation concerning political dissonance and further dollar devaluation seems to have subsided somewhat, yet the global problems still remain. Regardless, over the past few days, the markets have spiked higher. The rationalization is not quite there, except that technical levels have rejected bear territory at this point, and there is still hope for a eurozone solution. We look to a longer-term comparison chart of the US and Europe to project future movement.




European equities have declined to the point that they now border their 2010 lows. US markets are not quite there, but they're close. Further economic and confidence deterioration should transition our current support levels to those of the 2010 lows. This would in essence mean we had, without question, entered a bear market.



The chart of the VIX above is a way of conveying the lack of confidence that still exists in markets today. Over the past few months the situations in question have had the veil pulled off to reveal the magnitude of their problems. Until structural change occurs, the markets should remain in this volatile state.
Lastly, an indicator that will in fact let us know that the markets have calmed is seen in the S&P 500/US Treasuries relationship. When the two can reverse direction together, and with conviction, more confidence should arise and volatility should decline.

Disclosure: I have no positions in any stocks mentioned, and no plans to initiate any positions within the next 72 hours.

Tuesday 4 October 2011

S&P500 Facing an 18% Decline to 900 Soon

I have been shorting stocks since 5 Aug 2011. I shorted the Direxion Triple US Small Caps from USD65. Today it is at 28. Not bad for 2 months' work. Chart patterns show that most stock indices are about to break down another leg by between 18 - 25% down. Credit spreads have shot up again.

It's not about the Euro crisis any more. It's the lack of growth. Something that QE cannot resolve. There is no fiscal stimulus left to pull the west out of the crisis. Deleveraging of households in the west is stalling consumption and the governments are too bankrupt to help. The western governments have in the past resorted to populist policies. They promised the electorates free stuff that they know will have to be borrowed in expense of future growth. Fiscal stimulus at this point, at least a massive one that will stave off a global recession, will lead to massive debt downgrades and debt to GDP levels that are unsustainable in future. Interest payments will kill off future GDP growth. Had the western governments been more prudent in the last decade, fiscal stimulus would have been viable. But not now.

Even if the Euro crisis is resolved, focus will shift to the recession in the US and EU. Also, another big unknown is the Chinese banking crisis. As much as 30% of bad loans can turn bad. There may be large scale nationalisation of Chinese banks. The nationalisation of European banks may be a foregone conclusion.

2012 could be a worse situation than 2008. It could be the biggest, longest and deepest recession the world has ever seen since the Great Depression. Continue to short. Continue to buy more CTAs like Winton and Man AHL Trend. It could be a very bad one.