Wednesday 6 April 2011

Brussels: European City with Romantic Charm


European cities are charming. There is a mixture of old architecture from the last 3 to 9 centuries, alongside new structures. Tokyo is drab... mostly temples and same type of structures, same colour of facade, same designs. Don't get me wrong. I like Tokyo a lot. Asian cities are mostly known for their social discipline. Those in the north east of Asia especially. Very little pick pockets, low crime. There are of course, organised crime, like the Yakuza, and triads in Taiwan. But they mostly leave you alone unless you cross their paths.

Below is an example of an old cathedral near Grand Place. Like any other city in Europe, cathedrals and churches pepper the streets.



Brussels is famous of its mussels cooked in wine sauce. After downing the mussles, if you stomach still has capacity, you can dip pieces of french loafs on to the wine sauce in the pot. Quite delicious. I wonder why Singapore does not have such cuisine.




Below is the only advertisement on a shoebox unit in Brussels. Only 450 sq ft, it is asking for EUR650k, or around SGD2,456 psf. This is much more expensive than Singapore's units. As you can see, our luxury and mid sector homes are still cheaper than Europe's main cities. Even in a small city like Brussels, residential properties are more expensive than Singapore's. But shoebox units are not popular in Brussles. This is the only advertisement amongs the hundreds that I see out side of property agency offices. 



This is at "Soho", a clothing store with acres of space for avant garde statues outside.



Like most European cities, grafitti deface the walls. You don't see that in Asian cities like Tokyo and Singapore.


S&P500 Earnings Set to Surpass 2007 Peak of US$90 a Share in Q3

Published April 5, 2011


Huge corporate profits sustain S&P after rally

S&P500 earnings set to surpass 2007 peak of US$90 a share in Q3

(NEW YORK) The biggest increase in profits in more than a century is telling investors that this is no time to sell stocks, even after the Standard & Poor's 500 Index rallied 97 per cent.

Flying high: Apple has boosted net income to US$16.6 billion from US$7.25 billion in March 2009. The iPad maker is projected to grow net income 54 per cent in its fiscal year ending in September

S&P 500 earnings are poised to surpass the 2007 peak of US$90 a share in the third quarter after surging from US$7 in March 2009, the quickest recovery since at least 1900, according to data from S&P and Yale University's Robert Shiller.

The gap between projected 12-month profits and average earnings over the last 10 years is set to widen the most since 1951, the data show.

PNC Wealth Management, Federated Investors Inc and ING Investment Management, which together oversee about US$1 trillion, say consumer spending will sustain the recovery after government stimulus helped lift profits from the lowest level since the Great Depression.

While earnings will slow in the second half, stock purchases by investors who missed the S&P 500's advance will fuel gains, according to Leuthold Group LLC.

'People are more comfortable with the recovery than at any time over the last couple of years,' said Doug Ramsey, the Minneapolis-based director of research at Leuthold Group, which oversees US$3.9 billion and recommended buying equities four days before the bull market started. 'That's typically when retail investors regain courage', and may spur a rise of up to 25 per cent in the S&P 500 during the next 18 months, he said.

S&P 500 futures expiring in June gained 0.1 per cent at 8.48am in London. The benchmark index rose 1.4 per cent to 1,332.41 last week, bringing its 2011 advance to 6 per cent and putting it 0.8 per cent away from this year's high of 1,343.01 on Feb 18.

It slumped through March 16 following Japan's record earthquake and civil unrest in the Middle East and northern Africa. The gauge's gain since March 9, 2009 is the most over comparable periods since 1937, according to S&P's Howard Silverblatt.

Shares haven't kept up with earnings. S&P 500 companies' 12-month profits are projected to reach a record US$91 a share by August, according to estimates compiled by S&P and Bloomberg.

That would be the highest-ever level on an inflation-adjusted basis and up almost 13-fold from their low two years ago, S&P and Shiller data compiled by Bloomberg show.

The 50-month rebound in profits, following a 92 per cent drop during the global financial crisis, would be faster than the 52 months it took to recover from the bursting of the dot.com bubble in 2000, when earnings fell 55 per cent, the data show.

Profits didn't recoup their 67 per cent tumble during the Great Depression until 19 years later.

American International Group Inc, the New York-based insurer bailed out by US taxpayers, has posted the biggest turnaround since March 2009. AIG swung from a trailing 12-month loss of US$95.8 billion to net income of US$7.79 billion, according to data compiled by Bloomberg.

ConocoPhillips in Houston earned US$11.4 billion last year after losing US$20.3 billion in the 12 months through March 2009, the data show.

Apple Inc has boosted net income to US$16.6 billion from US$7.25 billion in March 2009. The Cupertino, California-based maker of iPads is projected to grow net income 54 per cent in its fiscal year ending in September, data compiled by Bloomberg show.

Apple is set to report second-quarter results on April 20.

The S&P 500 trades for 13.7 times estimated 2011 earnings, compared with an average of 15.7 times reported annual profit since 1900, Shiller data show.

Earnings for the measure will total US$95.21 this year, according to S&P's estimate when adjusted for inflation using the median economist projection for the consumer price index in a Bloomberg survey.

If that forecast is met and the 12-month price-earnings multiple climbs to its mean since 1900, the S&P 500 would rise 12 per cent to end December at 1,494, or 4.7 per cent away from its record of 1,565.15 on Oct 9, 2007. -- Bloomberg

News Articles on Stocks...

My comments: Prepare for the end of QE2 in the US. This may trigger the a correction in US stocks to the tune of 10 - 25%. Money may flow back to Asia x Japan and Emerging Market stocks as Japan is holding their own QE.

April 5, 2011, 2:00 p.m. EDT


Fed's post-QE2 debate underway:

By Greg Robb WASHINGTON (MarketWatch) - The Federal Reserve began at its March 15 meeting to debate the possible course of monetary policy after the $600 billion bond-buying program ends in June, according to the minutes of the meeting released Tuesday. A few Fed members said that economic conditions might unfold in a way that would warrant the launch of an exit plan this year. At the same time, a few others noted that the Fed's ultra-low monetary policy may be appropriate "beyond 2011." There was a lengthy discussion of the prospects of inflation in the wake of the sharp increase in oil and food prices. In the end, several Fed officials said that their forecasts of inflation had "shifted somewhat to the upside." Economic growth appeared to be on "firmer footing," the Fed officials said.



Published April 5, 2011


Emerging out of the growth ditch


A shift in global growth to emerging markets requires several changes in the financial infrastructure

By RAGHURAM G RAJAN

DEVELOPED countries, hobbled by high levels of household and government debt, are hoping that emerging markets will shoulder the burden of expanding global consumption and investment.

No shoe-in: China will not reform overnight and begin demanding huge amounts of consumer goods. But this could happen over time - indeed, China's 2011 economic plan emphasises the expansion of domestic demand

Clearly, consumption in poorer countries, such as Brazil, China, and India, as well as in Africa and the Middle East, is far lower than average consumption levels in richer ones, and so is their average physical capital - houses, roads, sewerages, and so on. There is clearly room for growth here.

Shifting future growth in spending from industrial countries to emerging markets also has a corresponding environmental benefit: since the production of physical goods, such as housing and cars, takes a toll on the environment, it is better for spending to go to moving the slum dweller in Cambodia into a brick house - a process that will happen sooner or later - than to moving the suburban American couple into a house with even bigger bedrooms that they will likely never use. Such an outcome may be the environmentally sustainable solution to both global trade imbalances and the incipient currency wars. So how to best bring about this necessary shift in global demand?


Growing domestic demand

Some change is already happening. The lesson China seems to have learned from the Great Recession is that it needs to reduce its dependence on foreign demand. The Chinese know that they cannot continue growing at double-digit rates without encountering protectionist barriers. While much of the world has fixated on China's manipulation of the yuan's value to expand domestic demand, Beijing knows that it is as important to reduce the pro-producer bias in its domestic policy, so as to boost household incomes and consumption.

In practice, this means increasing wages, raising interest rates for household bank deposits, and improving the delivery of health and educational services; at the same time, the government is raising corporate taxes and lowering corporate subsidies on inputs such as energy and land. The Chinese government is also encouraging investment in infrastructure to link the poorer, interior western provinces with the richer, coastal ones.

Exchange rate moves


Of course, various economic sectors in China are opposed to change, from China's cash-rich state-owned corporations and banks to foreign firms with production facilities in China that benefit from the low exchange rate. They will fight any loss of their privilege. China will not reform overnight and begin demanding huge amounts of consumer goods. But this could happen over time - indeed, China's 12th five-year plan, to be implemented beginning in early 2011, emphasises the expansion of domestic demand.

Other emerging markets, such as Brazil and India, which have historically not repressed consumption as severely as China, are already on a buying binge, buoyed by growing inflows of foreign capital. Trade among emerging-market countries is increasing rapidly. To facilitate this growth in demand, emerging countries will have to allow their real exchange rates to appreciate - either voluntarily, by accepting revaluations of their currencies, or involuntarily, by having higher inflation.

All this, however, raises an important question: Can emerging markets manage to increase their domestic spending in a more stable way than in the past, or will they experience yet another credit boom followed by a bust?

Assertive regulation

To keep the past from repeating, regulators in both emerging markets and developed economies will have to be more assertive. To ensure that foreign capital inflows do not once again support nonviable investments and irresponsible lending, foreign investors need to be exposed to the full risk of losses. At the same time, domestic financial firms should not have the incentive to expand their balance sheets rapidly when money is cheap.

Regulators in a country receiving capital should discourage short-term foreign-currency-denominated loans to their banking system. Instead, they should encourage foreign investors to make long-term direct loans to domestic nonfinancial firms, denominated in the local currency. Government regulators should increase capital requirements, tighten liquidity requirements, and limit leverage for domestic financial firms when credit expands rapidly.

Finally, domestic regulators should also improve their national bankruptcy systems so that investors will take a quick and relatively predictable hit when projects fail.

Biting the bullet


At the same time, regulators in countries with outward capital flows should be careful that their major financial institutions are not overly exposed to any one region, country, or sector. Irish taxpayers should not have to bail out their banks' bondholders simply because these bonds are held by British and German banks. Large cross-border banking firms currently operate with impunity, knowing they are virtually impossible to shut down and will therefore be bailed out when in danger.

Reaching an international accord on how to close these banks when they get into trouble will be difficult but important. Finally, multilateral institutions, such as the IMF, should force investors in a country's debt to take a significant loss if those institutions have to step in to bail the country out - or else taxpayers will end up having to pay both those institutions and the investors.

How best to include clear and transparent triggers for write-downs in debt contracts is not an easy question - but not an impossible one, either.

All these measures will raise the direct costs to emerging markets of borrowing and will make foreign investors more careful about lending. Higher direct costs will be more than offset by the benefits of more productive and sensible investments, not to mention the decreased likelihood of future busts.

A triple mandate?

The slowdown in spending by the industrial world will give emerging markets strong incentives to shift their growth strategies away from exports - stronger, in fact, than might emerge from any agreement produced by international summitry.

But will 'the Great Spender', the United States, cooperate and avoid yet again pumping up demand excessively? US households have certainly increased their savings rates in response to the recession and are trying to pay down their debt. But what is worrying is that many of the efforts of the Federal Reserve and the Obama administration - whether to keep interest rates very low or offer new tax benefits and government-supported credit for home purchases - have been meant to encourage household spending.

In the meantime, reduced government revenues and increased spending - the usual effects of a recession - have been coupled with repeated stimulus packages, which has led to a ballooning of public debt.

As in past recessions, Washington's central concern is job creation. Unfortunately, many of the jobs that were lost at the onset of the latest downturn were tied to construction: not only construction workers themselves but many of the supporting workers, such as home improvement contractors or real estate brokers and lenders, lost their jobs, as did those people who worked in manufacturing construction materials.

Given the extent of overbuilding during the last decade, it is unlikely that government spending or low interest rates will bring these jobs back. Instead, unemployed construction workers will have to gain new skills or relocate to areas that have jobs. In other words, the jobs recovery will require politicians to have new ideas, time, and patience - all of which are in short supply given the political pressure.

More generally, Washington must focus more on tailoring the skills and education of the US work force to the jobs that are being created, rather than hankering after the old jobs eliminated by technology or overseas competition. In this light, the Obama administration's focus on improving educational standards by measuring student performance, evaluating teachers' abilities, and increasing competition between schools is appropriate; indeed, such reform efforts should be pushed with even greater urgency.

The Fed as stabiliser

The United States also needs a better social safety net, not only to reassure workers but also to ensure that slow recoveries do not result in frenetic, and ultimately excessive, stimulus spending.

Finally, a more stable and less aggressive US monetary policy will not only lead to more sustainable US growth; it will also reduce the volatility of capital flows coming into and out of emerging markets. Given the thin safety net, the political pressure on the Federal Reserve to be adventurous with monetary policy when unemployment is high is enormous.

But such pressure can be counterproductive if the Fed's aggressive policies have little direct effect on employment but instead generate asset price bubbles and risky lending, which eventually impose high costs on the economy, including greater unemployment.

It is debatable whether Congress should force the Fed to take seriously its de facto role as the rate setter for the world and unlikely that Congress will ever expand the Fed's mandate to do so.

At the very least, however, the Fed's mandate should be extended to include financial stability explicitly, on par with its current responsibilities to keep inflation low and maximise employment.

The writer is professor of finance at the Booth School of Business at the University of Chicago and the author of 'Fault Lines: How Hidden Fractures Still Threaten the World Economy'. This article is sourced from Foreign Affairs, a publication of the US Council of Foreign Affairs. This is the third in a series drawn from a longer article in the March/April edition

Why Yen Repatriation Theory is All Wrong

The JPY has always tended to strengthen against USD due to their trade surplus against the US. That's why they persistently require Jap Govt intervention. The Jap govt was under pressure from their colonial masters the US not to intervene so that the US can dig themselves out of their economic hole, and so that Obama has a change of getting re-elected in 2012.

But with the earthquake and radiation leakage, there was an unprecendented intervention by G7 countries to intervene against the Yen strengthening. PLUS, the issuance of Japanese govt bonds to finance the rebuilding would have made bond investors jittery. As a result, whatever JPY that has been repatriated cannot outdo the immense monetary easing / quantitative easing that is to come.

Moral of the story: Never fight the governments. Never fight the Fed. You can never win. a weak JPY is "blessed" by G7. It means stock markets will rally.

Published April 5, 2011



Why yen repatriation theory is all wrong

Investors and insurance firms don't need to bring back assets in the wake of the quake





By TAISUKE TANAKA





FOLLOWING the devastating Tohoku earthquake on March 11, the markets assumed that Japan's vast need for financial resources during the reconstruction would bring about a significantly stronger yen. This would happen, the thinking went, because insurance companies and individuals would repatriate large amounts of money they had been investing overseas.







Irrational: Traders pushed the yen beyond 80 against the US dollar for the first time in 16 years on March17 and the G-7 intervened to stabilise the market. Repatriation by retail investors and insurers is unlikely to be sufficiently large to support the yen strength witnessed in the quake's immediate aftermath.

This belief became a self-fulfilling prophecy, as traders pushed the yen beyond 80 against the US dollar for the first time in 16 years on March 17, reaching a record 76.25. The G-7 launched a global currency intervention to stabilise the market.



The only problem is that this investment rationale is a myth. Financial repatriation by retail investors, non-life insurers and life insurers is unlikely to be sufficiently large to support the yen strength witnessed in the quake's immediate aftermath.



To understand why, look at each of the most affected investor classes in turn. The first class is the retail investor base. These investors hold around 25 trillion yen (S$376 billion) offshore. They haven't been repatriating those holdings in large quantities since the disaster, and are unlikely to start now.



History shows that retail investors are willing to send money abroad amid a wide variety of disasters. Of the 107 months since April 2002, only seven of those months have seen net selling of foreign currencies and purchases of yen, including during the most intense periods of global turmoil after the September 2008 collapse of Lehman Brothers. Japanese tend to view overseas investments as medium to long-term sources of income, not rainy-day funds for emergencies.



Early signs show this pattern will continue now. On March 23, a new investment trust managed by Nomura Asset Management raised 29.5 billion yen to invest in US equities, with options to take on separate currency exposure. Overall, Japanese investors were net buyers of foreign securities during the week of March 13-19.



Other factors also affect retail investor behaviour in the wake of the earthquake. Investors in the region most affected by the earthquake and tsunami - who would be most likely to repatriate money to finance reconstruction - have below-average holdings of foreign currency assets. The population of the devastated region has long been conservative in its investment choices.



Meanwhile, owners of foreign currency assets nationwide are unlikely to need to repatriate foreign investment capital to meet current needs for money. Ownership of foreign currency assets increases with income, and those with foreign assets generally have a significant amount of local savings already.



Then there are insurers. The burden facing non-life insurers is not as severe as might at first appear. True, they will face large payouts for policies on commercial properties. But their exposure in the residential market is limited by the government's Japan Earthquake Reinsurance (JER) programme.



In Japan, the majority of the insurance burden for residential property is transferred to the government and to JER. Even if total insured losses reach one trillion yen as reported by the Nikkei on March 21 (and this would be 13 times bigger than the losses endured following the Kobe earthquake of 1995), insurance payments would have almost no impact on the foreign exchange market.



In this scenario, the government would absorb roughly 44 per cent of the losses and JER would pay around 11.5 per cent. Thus, the burden for non-life insurers would reach only around 442.5 billion yen. This is only slightly more than half the 787 billion in yen cash and deposits held by insurers, according to the General Insurance Association of Japan.



JER also holds plenty of liquid assets: 22.4 billion of cash and deposits and 457.3 billion of government bonds.



Reinsurance payments



Meanwhile, although reinsurance flows related to policies on commercial property could reach 891 billion yen, this is smaller than the two trillion anticipated by some offshore investors. Moreover, reinsurance payments are likely to be spread over several months. Hence, these flows will not be sufficiently large to affect overall yen trading dynamics.



Expectations of repatriation of assets by life insurance companies have also been overblown. Insurance payments following the 1995 Kobe earthquake were only 48.8 billion yen, smaller than the amount paid by non-life insurers (78.3 billion yen). While the death toll from last month's disaster may be higher, the balance sheets of life insurers also are much bigger than those of non-life insurers. Life insurers hold more than two trillion yen in onshore cash and deposits, making it unlikely they'll need to repatriate significant amounts.



The earthquake will have an effect on the yen, but it will be different than what is commonly expected. The disaster may make Japanese investors hesitant to expand overseas risk-taking at the same rate as before - net outflows may remain, but they won't be as big as before. By reducing a depreciation pressure, this will ease up one of the brakes on the longer-term appreciation trend.



Overall, then, the G-7 was right to intervene when it did to stabilise the market. Absent the repatriation myth, there was no reason for foreign exchange markets to behave as they did, and the instability was dangerous at a time when Japan's economy can least afford a further negative shock.



Japan's recovery will be helped by maintaining the yen at a more appropriate level.



The writer is chief foreign exchange strategist and head of foreign exchange research, Japan, for Nomura Securities